IRAN, AND THORIUMMarch 2, 2012
I am grateful to Mr. V.T. for bringing this important post of Gerald Celente to my attention, and it speaks volumes for itself, not only in terms of the prospects that he mentions, but also in terms of its political and geopolitical implications:
It is true that thorium is being pursued by China, Japan, Brazil and India as a reliable reactor fuel alternative to uranium. Celente's proposal is reasonable...and that's the problem, for by pointing out the thorium alternative, Celente is in fact pointing out the danger that everyone is worried about: uranium enrichment is a quick and easy path to a bomb (after all, one does not need plutonium for a bomb).
And this brings us to a second point, one I pointed out as early as my book on the Nazi atom bomb project, Reich of the Black Sun, and that is, namely, that if one wants "more bang for the buck," a plutonium bomb is the way to go. But plutonium can only be synthesized in a reactor, and from uranium. As Celente puts it: "The problem isn’t that Iran seeks nuclear power. The problem is that, like the rest of the world, Iran has made a poor choice of nuclear fuel." But this statement only serves to expose the hypocrisy of other not-so-non-nuclear nations like Japan or Germany (or for that matter, even Canada), for the selection of uranium as a reactor fuel is a strategic decision, one that allows nations pursuing that alternative, should they choose to do so, to become a state possessing nuclear weapons relatively quickly. And I have already pointed out in blogs earlier these last two weeks, that in reality, many of these "non-nuclear" nations are in fact nuclear weapons powers, since they build warheads and delivery systems for other nations. Consider only Germany in this respect.
So we may only assume the same logic is operative in Iran's case, and one can only assume that the mullahs are not going to change their minds.