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July 6, 2012 By Joseph P. Farrell

An article over at from June 4, a little over a month ago, outlines the growing and almost certain case that the stuxnet virus was part of a covert cyber-warfare plan, developed during the G.W. Bush Administration and continued under the Obama Administration, to interfere with Iran's uranium enrichment program:

Stuxnet's origins decoded: Now we know who did it, but what does it mean?

The implications are spelled out here, but perhaps the most chilling paragraph in this article containing many significant observations and implications, is this:

"Does resolving the attribution problem change how we think about the Stuxnet attack? This question is important for Stuxnet: Does Iran have the right to use force in self-defense or hold the U.S. and Israel accountable? The question is also relevant to interest in using cyberweapons more extensively. If we expand use, what are we doing in policy and legal terms?

"Another risk involves how other countries respond in light of attribution of Stuxnet to the U.S. and Israel. Perhaps attribution will not matter because, before Stuxnet, experts believed that states were seriously exploring espionage and military uses of the Internet. Many perceived Stuxnet as a "game changer" without needing to know who was responsible. If nothing else, identification of Stuxnet's creators will deepen other countries' interests in defensive and offensive cyber capabilities -- a pattern seen many times before with weaponization of new technologies. How far this dynamic goes, and with what consequences for the Internet and cyberspace, remains to be seen, but history tells few encouraging tales concerning this pattern of behavior."

Yesterday I talked about the implications of such cyber warfare, and its history back to the Reagan Administration at least.

But this important article clues us in to yet another implication, albeit a subtle one, and that is, with the "plausible deniability" that such cyberwar technologies and techniques make potentially available to nations, corporations, or even individuals, the possibility evolves that such warfare could, and would, be conducted in an ongoing, unceasing manner... The "lack of response" may not be a lack at all, but merely the lull before counter-measures, and counter-attacks, are taken. Couple these technologies to other rumored capabilities - weather modification and manipulation, for example - and you get the idea of what they're already thinking about in their black projects agencies.

See you on the flip side.