My co-author on Transhumanism: A Grimoire of Alchemical Agendas, Dr. Scott D. deHart, sent me this one, and it merits sharing here and some commentary:
Before getting to the article itself, I want to recall an incident that, to this day, I find extraordinarily curious and more than disturbing. This was the state dinner that President Obama hosted for the then visiting Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Singh, in his first term. You might recall that there was a story - a strange one to be sure - that quickly appeared and then, just as quickly, was forgotten as it dropped off the radar screen of the lamestream media like a jet fighter in a power dive; this was the story that the state dinner for the Prime Minister had been crashed by two uninvited guests, who managed to get into the dinner. At the time, and to this day, I thought that an extraordinary lapse of security... and to this day, I think it was a not-so-subtle-message being sent to Mr. Obama. After all, he is a family man, with children. The message? "Do as we say, because we can get to you at any time." Don't get me wrong, I have no love lost for the President's policies, but there was no other way to my mind to interpret such an extraordinary lapses of security.
Now comes this article, that apparently there are organized groups within various intelligence agencies doing "Data Mining" - a polite euphemism for spying - on top officials, bureaucrats, military personnel - and a then sitting Senator from Illinois who had presidential aspirations. In case you missed it, here's Tice on his spying:
"Tice: Okay. They went after–and I know this because I had my hands literally on the paperwork for these sort of things–they went after high-ranking military officers; they went after members of Congress, both Senate and the House, especially on the intelligence committees and on the armed services committees and some of the–and judicial. But they went after other ones, too. They went after lawyers and law firms. All kinds of–heaps of lawyers and law firms. They went after judges. One of the judges is now sitting on the Supreme Court that I had his wiretap information in my hand. Two are former FISA court judges. They went after State Department officials. They went after people in the executive service that were part of the White House–their own people. They went after antiwar groups....
"One of the papers that I held in my hand was to wiretap a bunch of numbers associated with, with a 40-something-year-old wannabe senator from Illinois. You wouldn’t happen to know where that guy lives right now, would you? It’s a big white house in Washington, DC. That’s who they went after. And that’s the president of the United States now."
In other words, from an altogether different quarter, a bit of confirmation of my "state-dinner-intentional-security-lapse" scenario.
Consider the implications here: if it be possible to find "dirt" on someone via such data mining - and admit it, who doesn't have dirt? - then one might run for office in either political party, with the best of intentions, but, having attained it, been confronted with the proverbial manilla envelope through the mail slot in the front door, full of pictures, transcripts, what have you, with a polite note informing you on how to vote on this or that piece of legislation, "or else."
What the Snowden affair, the IRS affair, and similar scandals seem to be indicating is that there may very well be hidden reasons, deep within rogue groups that have seized control of the intelligence agencies that compose the national security apparatus, that are responsible for the growing non-responsiveness of government at the national level. And what is true here is most likely true in other western countries. How can elected officials do their job, and remain responsible to their public constituencies, if in fact they are beholden to hidden and occulted constituencies of an entirely different nature?
The terrible prospect raised by such questions are that the national security establishment could, under such circumstances, be capable of working against the national security.
In previous blogs I have raised such questions, not the least of which is that such capabilities also introduce intelligence groups as hidden players - with enormous capabilities - in the financial and currency markets, able to manipulate vast quantities of money and cash flow in the ultimate insider trading scenarios.
The bottom line?
I suspect that more and more of these types of scandals will break, and that what we've seen thus far is merely the tip of a very large iceberg. What worries me now, almost as much as the scandals themselves, is the backlash that might occur because of them.
See you on the flip side.