JAPAN’S GLIDING GUIDED MISSILE PLANS

Over the years, ever since Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe successfully rid Japan of its constitutional restraints on defense spending, I've been arguing that Japan has fundamentally changed its geopolitical and defense posture and is a "country to watch" in the Pacific. Central to my thesis is the hypothesis that Japan's rearmament has been based on a long-term assessment that the US Empire is failing, and is thus motivated by a double agenda: (1) convincing the US that Japan is willing to bear its "fair share" of its own defense burden, while (2) realizing that the US is, as the Russians put it, "not agreement capable," and that reliance upon such an untrustworthy ally is in the long-term just plain folly. Under such circumstances, Japanese re-armament, or rather, expanded armament is in my opinion inevitably designed to cut all military cords with Washington, and to restore it to equal negotiating status.

This assessment appears to be corroborated by Mr. Abe's recent negotiating strategies, particularly as far as Russia is concerned. In an unprecedented step, Mr. Abe agreed to set aside Japanese postwar claims on the Kurile Islands to arrive at understandings with Mr. Putin about the creation of a kind of "free trade" zone in those islands, and for his part, Mr. Putin agreed to allow more Japanese settlement in the Russian-occupied islands provided that it is understood that they are subject to Russian, and not Japanese, law. As a result, Russia and Japan have also negotiated lucrative deals, and as I blogged recently, the Japanese have conducted tests on portions of Russia's Trans-Siberian railway. As I speculated at the time, these tests I suspect are to gain Japanese expertise and experience (not to mention capital) to transform the line into high speed rail. The Japanese after all have been building high speed rail longer than just about anyone else. Geopolitically, it makes sense for both nations, for a Russo-Japanese rapprochement gives Japan a source of energy much closer to Japan, and not subject either to Chinese or American interdiction (and lest we forget, it was American interdiction of those energy supplies in 1941 that let to the outbreak of the war between the USA and Japan), and it gives Russia a counter-balance to growing Chinese power in the region. As if to drive that point home, Japan recently indicated to Australia that if France has difficulty completing a submarine order for the Australian navy, Japan would be only too happy to do so.

With that background, consider this important find from Mr. J.T.:

Defense Ministry aims for FY2026 introduction of 'high-speed gliding missiles'

What's crucial here are the first two paragraphs:

TOKYO -- The Ministry of Defense has decided on a plan to introduce a new type of "high-speed gliding missiles" with small wings attached to the payload to guide it to its target by fiscal 2026 for use by the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), an individual close to the matter has disclosed.

The development of the missiles will be divided into two stages, and the projectiles designated for use in protecting Japan's remote islands are expected to have a range of around 300 to 500 kilometers. However, this would mean an increase in the missile range of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and there is a possibility that the addition's compliance with Japan's policy of being exclusively defense-oriented will be questioned. (Emphasis added)

The fact that the article itself questions the rationale behind the development is an indicator of what is really happening. As Mr. J.T. put it in his email, it would appear that the real purpose here is to develop an operational and ultimately strategic offensive capability. Increasing ranges of missiles to 500 kilometers may not seem to be a big deal, except that when one adds the staging of missiles to employ guided gliding payloads to Japan's already-possessed heavy space payload launch capability, and what is in a few short years an operational offensive capability could become, in those same short years, a strategic offensive capability. China, Russia, USA (and Korea) take note (and I'm sure they already have).

Like it or not, all this means that Japan will increasingly become part of the geopolitical and military calculation of the Pacific rim, and it also means, I suspect, that my speculation that Japan's rearmament is about more than just doing its "fair share" in Pacific security. Even if that is all it is about, I strongly suspect that that "fair share" will only increase over time.

See you on the flip side...

21 thoughts on “JAPAN’S GLIDING GUIDED MISSILE PLANS”

  1. reading a new favorite author…
    https://archive.org/search.php?query=creator%3A%28%22revilo%20p%20oliver%22%29
    America’s Decline p12
    a year before Pearl Harbor FDR sent to the Portuguese an assurance not to worry about their SE Asian colonies and that the US would be involved in WWII and crush Japan, merely waiting for them no stretch herself out – Knowing that the Japanese had cracked the codes and that this would panic them into preemptive action. Very similar to Hitler knowing that Stalin had amassed 90 Divisions on the border, it was actually 200 (Irving Hitler’s War).
    All this subject to all the tyrants and kings not getting together at the end of a hard days world war and toasting each other for their part in the not so grand chessboard.

  2. . . . If one were to put strategic material emphasis on the “guided” portion of the gliding component one might have a means, if scaled upward to space, to divert very big inbound celestial masses from being the next extinction level causality. . .

    . . . In one’s humble opinion, it isn’t a matter of whether the US is an “untrustworthy ally” or “not agreement capable,” but more a matter of negotiating 21st Century geopolitical policies that level the playing field of opportunity and sucess and, if necessary, rescind useless and obstructive pre-existing treaties, policies, and agreements no longer fit for modern prosperity. . . Iranian treaty was such an example. . . The simple question, “How does one sanction against arms proliferation tactics when a pre-existing treaty negates much of that leverage from the start?”. . One ends with having a useless treaty or co$tly policy that is taken advantage of, exploited toward unforeseen goals not present at the time of its making, and one of the treaty members (US) made the fool or worse, sounding as if contradictory or hypocritical at a negotiating table meant to sort out misunderstandings to constructively move forward. . .

    . . . The business with Japan, as an island nation dependent on external resourcing, has certain needs and rights to secure its own shorelines from aggressor threats despite knowing what some of the consequences actually are for over-reaching with WWII mentality and Asian mainland plundering a second time around. . . Easily seen as a route of destruction not to be re-visited – Besides, there are other calculations and celestial matters of concern where terrestrial survival is front and center where the industriousness of the Japanese people are better suited and currently playing out. . . What may seem as a begging question requires more than calculations. . . It requires a global maturity of the species. . . That is a work-in-progress. . .

    . . . Japan is already a major player and “part of the geopolitical and military calculation of the Pacific rim,” and so are the Koreans. . . In fact, ALL the western Pacific Dragons play front and center economically and continually bump into each other in areas not before considered amongst themselves. . . They’re still developing, too, as are the rest of the front runners on the global scene. . . Communication technologies now make knowing about such maneuvers of each individual player in real-time at nearly light speed. . . A technology that might need taming. . . One is more concerned on whether there will be a time, soon in the making, that Mt Fuji will stop wearing its White Cap in winter and Tokyo becoming an underwater lagoon and artificial reef. . .

  3. What about all the talk about Fukushima being sabotage/reprisal from hostile (to Japan) interests? How does Japan defend herself against a sequel?

  4. doc, everybody, ya got check this guy out.

    www youtube com/watch?v=kcvUHdhROrk&feature=em-uploademail

    this is the guy who helped his kid get perfect pitch and documented it on yt. beauti stuff on bach.

  5. The real problem for Japan is who are the real it must answer to. The USA is only a front behind which the shadow puppeteers play their nefarious and deadly games. As for China attacking Japan that only happen under the Mongol Yuan dynasty it’s power has been cultural rather the military as regards Japan.

  6. Japan is a proud nation, with a proud Samurai past. Although beaten-down in WWII, it was occupied but never invaded (Okinawa aside). So, a few generations later, Japan is refusing to be a Belgium-class state, militarily-speaking. This is only natural.

    In my opinion, the decline (and possible implosion) of the US is only part of the equation. The actual ‘trigger’ for the rearmament is the more-aggressive stance of the Chinese state. In other words, from the ‘gliding guided missile’ to AEGIS installations, Japan is pushing-back on Chinese territorial aspirations. The Japanese leadership has to be terrified about the decade-long lead the Chinese have in production and deployment of modern, long-range weaponry. Their Samurai ancestry would prohibit them from becoming a Chinese ‘fiefdom’. The only other option is making it too expensive for the Chinese to try…

    (“Japanese original by Hiroshi Maetani, City News Department.” The cited article appears to be by someone with limited weaponry knowledge. Those ‘supersonic missiles’ bear a striking resemblance to everybody’s new ‘wunderkind’, the hypersonic gliding warheads. I suspect that is what the author is referring-to…)

    1. Distance from Fukuoka (city), Japan, to Beijing:
      1432 kilometers or 890 miles or 773 nautical miles

      Distance from Fukuoka (city), Japan, to Shanghai
      878 kilometers or 545 miles or 474 nautical miles

      Beijing is too far for the stated weaponry, but China’s coastal cities would be vulnerable. Coincidence?

    2. There’s no evidence China wants to take over Japan, nor does China wish to take over Vietnam or Burma, or Thailand.

      1. Lost, there are fiefdoms and then there are fiefdoms. One is a physical occupation, with the boot on your physical neck. The other is a financial/economic fiefdom, with the implied threat that “If our military is greater/better than yours, what are you going to do about it?” China has no inclination to physically-occupy Japan. However, China does want to be the dominant power in the SE Asia area. That is why the “Nine-Dash Line” has been pronounced, along with the New Silk Road push. This has all been backed-up with new, capable firepower. Japan has seen the danger in this posturing, and is taking steps to counter the situation. (For a historical counterpart, think of England’s trade/economic/sea war against the more financially-successful Dutch. Neither power physically-occupied the other.)

  7. Robert Barricklow

    That history of the U.S, cutting off Japan’s energy supplies that purposely forced Japan into war w/the U.S. is paramount. Japan’s been tied to the U.S. since. Other nations are likewise under the thumb of the U.S. juggernaut and looking to break those long standing chains.
    In this case power comes in economic control backed by force. That force is beginning to be challenged in order the break the economic chains. Still, the key are the satellite communications security/performance. Can they step outside the current system, with an independent one backed by a force of their own?
    Thus, the ongoing never-ending arms race continues, as does the communications warfare.

    1. Robert Barricklow

      … and of course the never ending economic war that’s now getting a lot of ink. What’s been hidden is now front & center. Not only is there class warfare; there is the nation states versus the international cartels.

  8. “(and lest we forget, it was American interdiction of those energy supplies in 1941 that let to the outbreak of the war between the USA and Japan)”

    News to me that the USA was preventing Japan from getting oil from Indonesia in 1941.

    I guess the UK could have leaned on the Dutch in Indonesia.

    So it’s vastly simplified to say that the US interdicted oil for Japan, in fact it’s in accurate. Since “interdict” implies some form of blockade, which didn’t exist of course.

    The US stopped selling oil to Japan. The the Japanese executed an attack they’d planned for nearly a year.

    1. so we’re back to arguing whether or not the ussa leadership were discussing and working on ways to provoke an attack from japan – long before pearl?

      1. zendog:

        And yet the Japanese made the choice to strike Pearl Harbor. The declaration of war, was drawn up and translated into English, in something like June of 1941.

        Now the British wanted it to happen. Probably the Soviets too.

        And US military intelligence in the Philippines knew of the general plan, not the specific date, but didn’t convey the information to Hawaii.

        1. first hit on any search – this is not to say i believe in consensus opinion in any area,…..

          www learnliberty org/blog/did-the-us-provoke-japans-attack-on-pearl-harbor/

          “In the four years leading up to Pearl Harbor, the US implemented ever more restrictive trade measures on Japan, including embargoes on much-needed oil, gasoline, and scrap metal, and froze Japanese assets. Other Western countries followed suit. As a result, Japan lost access to nearly 90% of its imported oil and three-quarters of its overseas trade.”

          and the article goes on. nobody was surprised. roosevelt et al were relieved. their declassified statements make it plain. they were worried about how to make japan strike first and how to make it a less damaging blow. that’s why they refused the requests to put the fleet out of harbor.

          1. Plus, the US’ vital aircraft carriers were ALL away from Pearl Harbor: the three Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers were USS Enterprise (CV-6), USS Lexington (CV-2), and USS Saratoga(CV-3). Yorktown (CV-5), Ranger (CV-4) and Wasp (CV-7) were in the Atlantic Fleet; Hornet (CV-8), commissioned in late October 1941, had yet to carry out her shakedown.
            https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/carrier-locations.html
            On 28 November 1941, Enterprise was sent from Pearl to ferry 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF) 211 to Wake Island. On 5 December 1941, Lexington was sent from Pearl to ferry 18 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 to Midway Island. (Saratoga had recently completed an overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, and was on her way to NAS San Diego.)

            So, coincidentally, Enterprise and Lexington were ‘ordered away’ on milk-runs, shortly before the attack. Move along; nothing to see here…

            ——–

            It could have been very different for Enterprise:
            http://www.cv6.org/1941/1941.htm
            “As part of this build-up, Enterprise shuttled Army Air Force P-39s and P-40s, as well as Navy planes, from West Coast ports to Pearl Harbor, and to outlying detachments on Wake and Guam further west. She departed on her last mission of this sort on November 28 – two days after Japan’s Pearl Harbor strike force sailed from Japan – carrying Marine pilots and their planes to Wake Island, flying them off on December 2 before turning east to return to Pearl. Forced to slow by a massive weather system which also sheltered the Japanese Combined Fleet advancing on Oahu, Enterprise missed her expected return date to Pearl Harbor: December 6. Instead, she was 150 miles west when the first Japanese bombs began to fall December 7.”

            (Again, was an Enterprise officer ‘informed’ NOT to be at Pearl Harbor on Dec 7th ?)

          2. cmon gosh. we all know it was kimmel’s fault. he failed to work with the army general. those two knuckleheads were worried about domestic sabotage for some obscure reason – like intelligence from their bosses? so yeh. keep them aircraft on land bunched. keep the anti air guns far away from any useful spot. yeh yeh.

          3. Atlantic magazine, July 1948
            “Pearl Harbor in Retrospect” by Sherman Miles (p.3):

            “The last twenty-four hours in Washington before the bombs fell have come in for much scrutiny. Why did the President, with most of the Japanese final answer before him, conclude that it meant war and then, after a fitful attempt to reach Admiral Stark by telephone, quietly go to bed? Why was he in seclusion the following morning? Why was no action taken on the Japanese reply by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy when they met on that Sunday morning? Why did they not consult the President, or he send for them? Where was everybody…”
            — and —
            Reassessing the Presidency: The Rise of the Executive State and the Decline of Freedom (2001) by John V. Denson (p.510):

            “The transcript of the Joint Congressional Committee hearings in 1945-1946 shows that General Marshall testified he had been riding his horse during the early morning hours of December 7, and that he did not arrive at his office until about 11: A.M. at which time he was given the complete, fourteen-part message by two of his most senior intelligence officers, Brigadier General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus Bratton. Marshall also had a scrambler on his desk that would have allowed him to make a direct call to General Short [in Hawaii], but instead of making the call he slowly and deliberately read through the message while both Miles and Bratton frantically tried to tell him about the crucial delivery message and the time limitation of 1:00 P.M. Washington time. Finally, with the office clock showing nearly noon, Marshall wrote out a warning message in pencil in nearly illegible handwriting and then told Miles and Bratton that the message was to be sent to Admiral Kimmel [in Hawaii] on a nonpriority basis. The message, therefore, went by normal Western Union telegram and arrived at Kimmel’s office after the attack had occurred. General Marshall then returned the call to Admiral Stark, who had been waiting for about two hours to talk to him.”

            “Admiral J.O. Richardson, the original commander at Pearl Harbor who was relieved by Roosevelt, wrote his memoirs in 1956 but delayed publication until 1973, a year after his friend Admiral Stark died and a year before Richardson’s own death.”

            “He gave his opinion that Stark and Marshall were under orders from President Roosevelt not to warn Kimmel and Short. Elsewhere Richardson has written:

            ‘I am impelled to believe that sometime prior to December 7, the President had directed that only Marshall could send any warning message to the Hawaiian area. I do no know this to be a fact and I cannot prove it. I believe this because of my knowledge of Stark and the fact that his means of communications with Kimmel were equal to, if not superior to those available to Marshall for communication with Short. He made no effort to warn Kimmel on the morning of December 7, but referred the matter to Marshall.'”

          4. yep. kimmel’s grandson is just starting to make progress on clearing his grandfather’s name.

  9. anakephalaiosis

    High speed rail is samurai sword – Thames Scramasax – forging haiku images together.

    Trans-Siberian railway is mental map bringing sequential dots together.

    Patristic exegesis – in image of Christ – brings no peace, only sword drawn from Stone.

    TRICK OR TREAT 11
    Pain is broken heart,
    for wrongdoers to take a look,
    into themselves.

Comments are closed.