Now, if you're like me and suspect something mighty fishy about that Indonesian airliner crash of Lion flight 610, with so many members of the Indonesian government's finance ministry aboard, then you're going to love this.
But first, a word: these two articles were shared by an individual who shall remain "initialless." Normally, as regular readers here know, I like to thank individuals, when I can, for contributing articles to the site. But sometimes, discretion demands that even that bit of personal acknowledgement be kept entirely anonymous. This is one such case, and to that individual, thank you for sharing these articles and your thoughts, some of which will be reflected in my high octane speculations.
So with that on record, on to the articles. The first article concerns a Boeing statement on the sensor problem on the 737MAX:
There are some troubling things to note here:
Experts have said the angle of attack is a crucial parameter that helps the aircraft's computers understand whether its nose is too high relative to the current of air – a phenomenon that can throw the plane into an aerodynamic stall and make it fall.
The FAA said the "erroneous inputs can potentially make the horizontal stabilizers repeatedly pitch the nose of the airplane downward, making the aircraft difficult to control."
The agency said the order was effective immediately and applies to nearly 250 aircraft worldwide, including 45 in the United States.
The FAA directive ordered operators to revise the airplane flight manual to give flight crews horizontal stabilizer trim procedures to follow under certain conditions.
Some modern aircraft have systems designed to correct the posture of the aircraft automatically to keep flying safely.
There are also procedures for pilots to follow in the event of missing data from damaged sensors on the fuselage, but it remained unclear how much time the crew of flight JT-610 had to respond at the relatively low altitude of around 5,000 feet.
An angle of attack sensor had been changed by mechanics on the ground in Bali the day before the crash, Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT) has said.
Now, I'm not a pilot. So I may be entirely wrong here, but the way I'm reading this article, it is saying (1) there's a massive problem with the angle of attack sensors and (2) we're not going to correct (or replace) the sensors, but update the flight manuals so that pilots know how to detect and correct for false data from said sensors! What we're not being told, in other words, is who made the sensors, and where they were made. But in a world where we have had suspicious ship collisions, and a US military voicing (quietly of course) increasing concerns over Chinese computer chips, I have my suspicions.
But then there's that final line in the quotation above, indicating that one of the angle of attack sensors had been changed out by ground mechanics the day before the fatal flight. That makes me even more suspicious, as I received an email - from someone other than our "article sharer" and who like our article sharer shall remain "initialless" - who indicated he had some professional aviation engineering background, and that he was highly suspicious that the flight had been externally controlled and crashed intentionally. At the time, I didn't have the present article in front of me, but changing out equipment on a sensor array that in itself is already admitted to have some "problems," seems to heighten the possibilities of deliberate sabotage.
So the question is why? In that respect, our initialless article sharer also shared the following article:
What's unusual here is that the article sharer informed me that the initial financing of this deal was to be through bank syndication, rather than offering of bonds, which change occurred shortly after the crash of flight 610, which puts a financial motivation behind the crash, but falls short of indicating who, and why. Here any number of scenarios present themselves, none of which, as of this writing, have much evidence to sustain them. If the crash was designed to prevent any financing of the mine deal, then it backfired, as the Indonesian government appears to have side-stepped the result by the bond offering. If on the other hand, the crash was designed to prevent a syndicate of banks from gaining control over valuable mining assets and Indonesian infrastructure, then it may have been a wildly successful venture. It is, to my mind, at least minimally suspicious that tranches of bonds were ready to go, seemingly "from nowhere", as a result of the aftermath of the crash. This is not to cast suspicions on the Indonesian government, for it is highly likely this was a "plan B" already waiting in the wings should the syndication fall through.
The bottom line though is that at least for me, the suspicion meter on this crash just moved from the dark orange-red zone, into the all-red zone.
See you on the flip side...