This week I've been blogging about stories that herald some significant geopolitical changes. Yesterday, for example, I argued that we're watching a "Quadruple Entente" emerge in the Pacific over growing concerns about Communist Chinese aggressiveness. This "Quadruple Entente" consisting of the USA, Russia, India, and Japan, around which are clustered smaller regional powers, is less a formal alliance system than an informal understanding that the Communist Chinese government is both aggressive, not to be trusted, and, paradoxically, weak.
But now there's a similar geopolitical revolution getting underway half a world away in Europe, and true to form, it's Germany pointing it out, according to these two stories shared by M.G., and W.G. (no relation!):
Let's look at some statements from these two articles before I offer my daily speculations on what all this means. Consider, for example, this statement from the first article:
The days of the good old ‘transatlantic partnership’ have passed, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has admitted, adding that even the Democrats returning to power is unlikely to automatically bring those days back.
“Anyone, who believes that the transatlantic partnership will once again be what it once was with a Democratic president, underestimates the structural changes,” the minister told German news agency dpa, hinting that relations between the two allies will never be the same even without President Donald Trump at the helm in Washington. (Bold italics emphasis added)
"Structural changes" is a wonderful phrase, masking a multitude of globalist dogmas which, under Mad Madam Merkel, the German government has been only too slavishly willing to follow. Not the least of these "structural changes" was the emergence of the European Union itself and, more recently, Franco-German calls for a common European military. In this respect, a few years ago I blogged about the then German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier's statements to a group of German businessmen meeting in Berlin that Germany needed to assume a much more militaristic and firm foreign policy stance than it had in the post-war period up to that point. As far as I was concerned then, and this remains my position now, Herr Steinmeier's words were a bit "disconcerting," since under Chancellor Kohl - mentor to Angela Merkel - the German government had played the principal and pivotal role in the crack-up of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, being the first government of a major power to recognize Croatia, and then becoming the first occasion since the end of World War Two when elements of the German Army and Luftwaffe were dispatched as peace-keepers to Croatia to enforce the point. Subsequent Kohl arm-twisting led to the capitulation of the Czech republic to German conditions for entry into the EU. At the time, the Czech media complained that the country was once again being made a protectorate. Similarly, it was Kohl who insisted that, if there was to be any "EU," its central bank had to be located in Germany. (See my book The Nazi International). At the time I wrote the blog, and in the light of the Kohl government's post-reunification behavior, I wondered just exactly what Herr Steinmeier meant by a more firm foreign policy. With respect to a common European military, Germany has not waited for it to happen, as the German military, the Bundeswehr, has already integrated various Dutch and Czech and other nations' units into its command structure.
My point here is not to pick on Germany but rather to point out that the "structural changes" of which the current German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, speaks were well underway during the Obama Administration. The real question is why Chancellorin Merkel has decided to make her statements now, and I suspect it has nothing to do with Mr. Trump.
The clue lies in the second article from RT:
In short, what is uppermost in Merkel's mind is probably coming from a political, cultural, and economic analysis that her Foreign Ministry and intelligence services have conducted with respect to three powers: India, China, and the USA. In the case of the first two, that analysis would be straightforward and include most of the points I have rehearsed in the previous two days' blogs. With respect to the USA, Merkel's government and long term planners are likely seeing the very same thing that Mr. Abe's government is seeing: the USA is a country increasingly divided culturally, there is a widespread breakdown of confidence in government institutions at the federal level in the USA, there are various secessionist movements on both the left and the right, and an inability to resolve domestic difficulties "within the system". And the situation for the long run does not look like it will improve given the rise of a radical and violent left in the country which is not going to go away any time soon and which, should it ever take power, will not look kindly on "bourgeois" powers like France or Germany. Notably, Merkel is really saying the same thing as Mr. Abe's government: we will continue to support our alliance with the USA, while re-arming for the possible eventuality that we well have to assume the burden of our own deterrence and defense; or as Herr Maas put this point in the first article:
Still, he also admitted that Berlin is not ready to give up on its longstanding alliance with Washington just yet. “The transatlantic relations are extraordinarily important, they will remain important and we are working to make sure they have a future,” he said.
The reference to the "shared nuclear umbrella" is also intriguing, since this means that with the departure of Great Britain from the EU, that country's "nuclear umbrella's" extension to Germany is no longer as solid as it once was. That leaves France as the only nuclear and thermonuclear power in the European Union, and I can see no situation, in spite all of globaloney dogmas and reassurances, that would convince France to share sovereign control of that umbrella with any other nation, especially Germany. Thus, behind Frau Merkel's pleasant words, I strongly suspect there lurks some internal pressure for the formation of a strategic deterrent on the part of Germany itself. Indeed, the Bundeswehr has done such studies in the past, and in most instances concluded that such a step would eventually become necessary.
Merkel would do well to consider the recent Japanese statements, which included deliberate mention of "kinetic weapons," weapons which, if deployed in space, would have a similar strategic destruction potential, without all the nasty fallout consequences of nuclear weapons. And it would avoid treaty undertakings by the German government not to develop nuclear weapons.
Of course, to assume she and her military experts are not familiar with those statements and with the possibilities afforded by kinetic weapons is to assume a level of incompetence and stupidity on their part that is simply impossible.
One may disagree with her, but she, and her advisors, anything but stupid.
See you on the flip side...