GERMAN FINANCE MINISTRY ADVISOR: EUROPE MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE EUROAugust 29, 2013
We've been following the story of the eurozone and Germany rather closely here on this website, particularly as regards to Germany's demands to repatriate its gold from the Bank of England, from the Banque de France, and the New York Federal Reserve. Most people by now know this story: Germany has been told "You can have it....in seven years," a polite and euphemistic way of saying "Come back in seven years and we'll come up with another excuse not to return it."
This type of behavior has sparked endless internet rumors that the Fed doesn't have it at all, and is trying to conceal the fact. Well, as I have pointed out in other blogs on this site, the problem of Germany's gold in the New York Fed seems to go back at least to 1928, when visiting Reichsbank President, Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht paid a visit to his friend, Benjamin Stong, in New York City. Asking to see his country's gold, Strong took Schacht down into the vaults, only to be told by his staff that...well...that they couldn't find Germany's gold. Schacht, in his memoirs, stated that he wasn't worried, and informed his friend Strong that "I know you're good for it." More probably, Schacht knew exactly what was going on, and Strong and the banksters knew that Schacht knew. Maybe this whole episode - among others - was one reason the tall lanky German-American-and-back-to-German Schacht received such a light sentence at Nuremberg on the conclusion of World War Two.
Episodes like this do not, of course, inspire confidence in the Western financial system, and over several blogs on this site, I have made the prediction that while its economy is robust, Germany simply does not have the locomotive traction to pull Europe out of the fiasco that the euro has proven to be, nor to pull the spendthrift governments of southern Europe out of their (bankster-engineered) slumps. Similarly, I've also been predicting that Germany would quietly play its traditional balance of power diplomatic act between the western powers (France, the UK, and the USA) while reaching out and courting the eastern power (Russia). Preparatory to any major geopolitical realignment toward the east and the BRICSA nations, Germany would face reality, withdraw from the Eurozone, reinstitute the Deutschmark, while maintaining some sort of presence in NATO.
Well, the noises perhaps may perhaps be sounded. Consider this little article:
There is also, for those able to read German, an interesting interview with Herr Konrad at Die Welt, here:
The title of the latter, "Deutschland kann die Euro-Zone nicht retten," Germany cannot save the Euro-Zone, says it all.
What is more intriguing however is the level from which this comes: high enough in the finance ministry to make everyone sit up and take notice, and yet, not from anyone official. In other words, it appears that the German government might be using a non-official spokesman to float a trial balloon, a limited hang-out position, to gauge the measure of response that will inevitably come from France, Britain, and the USA, none of whom would desire any deepening German ties with Russia. After all, the last time those ties were "deepened" Poland disappeared in two weeks, and France a few months later. Obviously, Germany is not planning any such thing, nor are the Russians, but historical memories are long, and the geopolitical consequences of such a realignment would be far reaching.
The message, however, coming from Herr Konrad is interesting from yet another point of view, and that is his insistence that Europe itself is worth saving, and that this cultural heritage is somehow in conflict with the whole nonsensical idea of the Eurozone itself. Southern Europeans in Italy and Spain, the other two large economies in Europe, know all too well the consequences of Brussels-driven austerity, with Berlin playing the role of bad cop and enforcer, and none of this is to the liking of Spaniards, Italians, or, for that matter, the Germans bailing out their spendthrift governments.
In short, Herr Konrad his signaled a new dialectical tension that, I suspect, is going to become a major theme of debates in Europe in the future: the tension between euro-hysteria and utopian visions coming out of Brussels and various banks and their famous banking dynasty families on the one hand, and the realities of European culture and politics on the other. When Germany starts coupling such analyses with renewed - though probably quietly voiced - calls for its gold to be repatriated, that's when to start thinking, for that will be another sign that that country - rightly - is tired of playing the role of a client puppet state of Washington and London.
See you on the flip side.